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Introduction
In the next 25 years, energy consumption will double.1 The growth of energy 
consumption is directly linked with economic development.2 Although progress 
towards energy effi  ciency allows limiting those needs to a certain extent, the fact 
remains: there is no growth without a steady increase in energy supply. That is 
the reason why states tend to tightly control energy markets. Even countries em-
bracing free-market capitalism, such as the United States, do control the foreign 
investments in this sector.3 The reason is simple: if one would be able to capture 
a segment of the internal energy market, one would be able to directly shape 
1 U.S Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Outlook 2017”, 
14.09.2017, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2017).pdf [accessed: 14.07.2018].
2 D.I. Stern, “Economic Growth and Energy”, [in:] Encyclopedia of Energy, Vol. 2, eds. 
C.J. Cleveland, R.U. Ayres, Amsterdam 2004, http://sterndavidi.com/Publications/Growth.pdf [ac-
cessed: 14.07.2018].
3 F. Wehrlé, J. Pohl, Investment Policies Related to National Security: A Survey of Coun-














the economy of the United States. This can be a powerful tool of infl uence over 
Washington’s domestic politics and as a result – foreign policy as well.
Direct control over the market is not the only option, however. States typ-
ically protect themselves from unwanted elements that can be dangerous. But 
they cannot defend themselves against the lack of energy resources. The world 
distribution of energy resources creates vulnerabilities and dependencies. A state 
blessed with an abundance of strategic materials such as oil or gas can infl uence 
policies and domestic aff airs of other actors of the international arena. This vul-
nerability is exploited most notably by countries that lack traditional dimensions 
of power or cannot use them in the current globalized world. Since the “current 
globalized world” is a by-product of the U.S. position as the only superpower, by 
design those countries are acting against the U.S. interests. States such as Russia, 
Iran or Venezuela are the most obvious examples of this. Revenues from oil and 
gas as well as the general dependency on hydrocarbons were used to fuel anti-
American foreign policy goals.
However not only states that are local challengers to the U.S. interests used 
oil revenues to support their moves on the international arena. Countries that are 
formal allies of the U.S., such as Saudi Arabia also utilized a similar strategy 
against Washington – although not openly. By subsidizing other governments4 
Saudi Arabia was impacting the balance of powers in the Middle East. Oil rev-
enues were also used as a soft policy tool – to infl uence Western politicians and 
public opinion.5
What Saudi Arabia and Russia have in common is not an anti-U.S. stance, 
but rather the way in which they adjusted to an American-dominated world while 
maintaining non-democratic regimes. The same oil revenues that allowed them 
to pursue a more robust foreign policy also made maintaining authoritarian rule 
possible. Contrary to appearances, the situation of those regimes is very fragile – 
they use redistribution of wealth as a way of controlling popular dissent and as 
a tool for creating alliances within the upper echelons of society. They buy loyalty 
and legitimacy. As long as they deliver on their redistribution promises they are 
able to pacify opposition since the opposition has a diffi  cult time justifying its 
hostility towards the government. This leads to the marginalization of the dissent-
ing voices and trough that – increased stability of the regime.
This is a unifying factor for a couple of countries – both U.S. allies and 
challengers to its position. All of them, however, will be potential victims of 
the new Washington energy policy that aims at utilizing the shale revolution to 
4 Center for International Communication, “Saudi Arabia’s Aid to the World Reaches 
Nearly $33 Billion in 10 years”, 28.02.2017, https://cic.org.sa/2018/02/saudi-arabias-aid-to-the-
world-reaches-nearly-33-billion-in-10-years/ [accessed: 14.07.2018].
5 S. Tisdall, “Saudi Arabia and the West: How a Cosy Relationship Turned Toxic”, The 
Guardian, 27.01.2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/27/saudi-arabia-and-the-
west-how-cosy-relationship-turned-toxic [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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dominate the market of hydrocarbons. Although the shale revolution is equally 
impactful for gas and oil markets, the article will mostly be covering the ques-
tion of oil.
The shale revolution is an umbrella term used to defi ne the radical shifts 
in the oil and gas mining industry that unleashed new, untapped sources of 
those strategic resources. This was achieved thanks to the new mining tech-
niques that allowed exploitation of reserves that were not previously reach-
able or that were not profi table – within rock formations known as shale. Now 
they can be extracted at a competitive price. Just like with traditional oil and 
gas reserves, shale is not distributed evenly around the world – some states 
have been blessed with more shale formations than others. The United States is 
among those with the biggest reserves. United States Geological Survey esti-
mates them at around 4.2 trillion barrels in total6 (estimates for other regions of 
the world do not exceed 250 billion; Saudi Arabia proved reserves are around 
260 billion barrels7). Not only that, but the U.S. is the pioneer in technologies 
allowing their extraction. This allowed American companies to fl ood the mar-
kets with the shale oil, dropping its price between 2013 and 2015 from 110 to 
30 dollars (in 2018 it stands at 70 dollars).8 In 2018 U.S. was producing daily 
9.3 million barrels of oil9, and Saudi Arabia responded to that by raising its tar-
get production to above 10 million per day.10 Regardless, by 2022 the U.S. will 
become a net energy exporter.
This creates market pressures on oil-exporting countries that made their 
state budgets dependent on the oil revenues. Both OPEC countries and inde-
pendent producers such as Russia are in a tough position, where they cannot use 
6 R.C. Johnson, T.J. Mercier, M.E. Brownfi eld, M.P. Pantea, J.G. Self, “Assessment of 
In-Place Oil Shale Resources of the Green River Formation, Piceance Basin, Western Colorado”, 
United States Geological Survey 2009, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3012/pdf/FS09-3012.pdf; 
R.C. Johnson, T.J. Mercier, M.E. Brownfi eld, “Assessment of In-Place Oil Shale Resources of 
the Green River Formation, Greater Green River Basin in Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah”, United 
States Geological Survey 2011, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3063/pdf/FS11-3063.pdf; R.C. John-
son, T.J. Mercier, M.E. Brownfi eld, J. G. Self, “Assessment of In-Place Oil Shale Resources of the 
Green River Formation, Uinta Basin, Utah and Colorado”, United States Geological Survey 2010, 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3010/pdf/FS10-3010.pdf [accessed: 14.07.2018].
7 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “Saudi Arabia Facts and Figures”, 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm [accessed: 14.07.2018].
8 Market Insider Crude Oil Data, http://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities/
oil-price?type=wti [accessed: 14.07.2018].
9 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “How Much of the Oil Produced in the United 
States is Consumed in the United States?”, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=268&t=6; 
T. DiChristopher, “US Will Be a Net Energy Exporter by 2022, Four Years Sooner Than Expected, 
Energy Department Says”, CNBC, 07.02.2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/07/united-states-
will-be-a-net-energy-exporter.html [accessed: 14.07.2018].
10 J. Blas, W. Kennedy, W. Mahdi, “Saudi Arabia Is Planning Record Crude Oil Production 
in July”, Bloomberg, 26.06.2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-26/saudi-
arabia-is-said-to-plan-record-crude-oil-production-in-july [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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traditional tools of price control to make their revenues stable. Typically a de-
crease in the daily oil production was enough to increase the price. However, in 
the case of shale oil and gas produced by the U.S., this strategy is out of the ques-
tion because it will make shale reserves only more competitive and will facilitate 
their expansion. The only way to defeat this competition is to lower the prices so 
signifi cantly that shale will cease to be profi table – it is, after all, a more capital-
intensive method of extraction than traditional reserves. This, however, means 
that budgets of oil-revenue dependent countries will run on a defi cit since they 
require the price of hydrocarbons to remain above a certain threshold, one that 
will not be achieved under these circumstances. In other words, oil regimes are 
in a lose-lose position where the only way to win with a competitor such as the 
U.S. is to destroy the very thing that they try to protect: high oil prices. And with 
this goes away their internal stability. As revenues shrink but spending remains 
fi xed out of necessity, their freedom of action will decrease. And although they 
may ultimately win this race, this may be a Pyrrhic victory. American companies 
appear to be more resilient, competitive and profi table than previously thought, 
lowering their breakeven price since 2014 by almost 50%.11 Even newer tech-
nologies make the breakeven price lower by an additional 50 to 90%, below the 
production costs of Saudi oil.12 This leads to major changes in the composition of 
the U.S. economy, making it more competitive. Indeed thanks to the shale revolu-
tion on the gas market America already started to increase (although in a limited 
capacity) the share of the manufacturing sector in its economy. Lower energy 
prices allow companies to come back from China or other low-labour-cost states 
to the U.S.13 If this can be repeated with oil, one can expect the furthering of this 
trend. Apart from that, the shale revolution lowered the American trade defi cit by 
half between 2008 and 2013 alone due to the smaller import of hydrocarbons.14 
Even if energy will not be supplied only by the U.S. sources, lower energy prices 
will allow Washington to continue this trend. It is a rare situation where a country 
is in an “always-win” position.
Especially since in the long run oil-exporting countries like Saudi Arabia 
or Russia may face collapse regardless: a prolonged period of competition that 
drives prices below what is needed for their budgets to stay balanced will require 
11 Rystad Energy, “Permian Midland Review: Acreage High Grading and Breakeven 
Prices”, March 2017, https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/newsletters/UsArchive/
shale-newsletter-march-2017 [accessed: 14.07.2018].
12 M.P. Mills, SHALE 2.0. Technology and the Coming Big-Data Revolution in America’s 
Shale Oil Fields, Energy Policy & Environment Report 2015 (16), https://www.manhattan-insti-
tute.org/pdf/eper_16.pdf [accessed: 14.07.2018].
13 O. Celasun, G. Di Bella, T. Mahedy, C. Papageorgiou, The U.S. Manufacturing Recov-
ery: Uptick or Renaissance?, IMF Working Paper 2014 (28), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
wp/2014/wp1428.pdf [accessed: 14.07.2018].
14 International Monetary Fund, Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties, World Economic Outlook 
October 2014, p. 28, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/ [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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absorbing losses. This will lead to the use of money gathered in wealth funds as 
well as borrowing on fi nancial markets. Oil exporting regimes, as already dis-
cussed, require oil and gas revenues to stay in power: spending is the key to pac-
ify dissent. Decreasing spending, therefore, may not be an option, and borrowing 
money or using reserves may be preferable instead. However this is a short term 
solution, and ultimately they will have to make cuts somewhere. When faced 
with a dilemma – maintain global infl uences or social order – they will probably 
choose the latter. This means that in order to maintain stability they will limit 
their foreign ambitions. If they will do the reverse – they risk destabilization.
It is not impossible, that oil-exporting regimes will withstand attack from 
the shale oil, and will navigate through dangerous moments of depletion of their 
fi nancial reserves. However, it does not seem likely that this will be a quick vic-
tory. Rather a prolonged match. And it may turn out that this was a win not worth 
the price: regimes will become internationally more passive, concentrated on in-
ternal situation, giving room for the U.S. policymakers to exploit. But regardless 
of what the regimes will do they still may be doomed.
Behind the shale revolution runs the electro-mobility revolution. Advance-
ments in technologies of battery production are hailing the new era of electric-on-
ly transportation: cars, trucks, soon perhaps even airplanes and ships will be run-
ning on electricity from batteries. Global transformation of this kind is thought 
to be very possible in the upcoming two decades. This in combination with self-
driving systems and sharing economy potentially can decimate global hydrocar-
bon needs.15 But cars are merely the beginning – once the technology is scaled up, 
it will change the way equation of costs and profi ts works for the entire energy 
industry, making nuclear and renewables highly competitive vis a vis traditional 
sources of energy like oil, gas, and coal.16 Energy will not have to be produced 
constantly and fed into the grid. Instead, it will be possible to store it for later use. 
Costs will drop across the board. Thus even if oil regimes will somehow survive 
competition with the shale revolution, they may realize that the world simply 
went ahead and they have been left behind: loosing revenues, infl uences and most 
importantly – becoming basket cases of instability. This would allow the U.S. to 
freely move into their regions of infl uence and intervene in their internal aff airs 
if Washington chooses to do so. One can expect that the end result of this process 
will be a world with less amount of local powers opposing the U.S. For Washing-
ton this will be a better environment to deal with Chinese ambitions.
15 J. Arbib, T. Seba, “Rethinking Transportation 2020–2030. The Disruption of Transpor-
tation and the Collapse of the Internal-Combustion Vehicle and Oil Industries. A RethinkX Sector 
Disruption Report May 2017”, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/585c3439be65942f022bb-
f9b/t/59f279b3652deaab9520fba6/1509063126843/RethinkX+Report_102517.pdf [accessed: 
14.07.2018].




How does the plan of Energy Dominance fi t into that? It is not creating 
the abovementioned scenario, but rather recognizes it as a possibility and works 
towards getting rid of barriers that may slow it down or stop it. Forces that created 
shale and electric revolutions are already unleashed. New technologies lowering 
prices of extraction are under way17, and the amount of viable oil and gas reserves 
is increasing with them. Corporations worldwide have been forced by American 
advancements in battery production to begin their own projects of a similar kind 
and prices of batteries are falling consistently.
Trump’s administration, therefore, does not have to create anything. It has 
to merely avoid obstruction of the process. Energy Domination Plan concentrates 
on regulatory changes, allowing for easier drilling and search. Similar regulatory 
changes allow for the creation of new pipelines, especially the Keystone pipeline 
linking oil sands of Canada with the U.S. and global market. Canada is another 
country that enjoys the benefi ts of the shale revolution. Its reserves of unconven-
tional oil are perhaps not as huge, but still impressive. Therefore “the plan” does 
not include anything strategic in mind, apart from building a gas supply chain 
to South Korea. The rest will happen on its own thanks to private enterprise and 
market forces.
To conclude, the energy Domination Plan is not a specifi c strategy, but 
rather a recognition of a set of circumstances that allows the U.S. to think about 
becoming a dominant player on the world energy market, creating pressures on 
key hydrocarbon suppliers. It is clearly meant to hurt their position and to revi-
talize Washington’s stance in the global hierarchy. Therefore the correct way of 
viewing its purpose is not trough examination of the policy itself, but rather of 
probable consequences of trends that policy tries to capitalize on. Looking at his-
torical examples of similar exploits and comparing them to the existing situation 
may allow one to see this more clearly.
How the East was won: the fall of USSR due to oil prices dependency
In the ’70s the United States was going through a period of weakness. This was 
due to a combination of various factors creating “the perfect storm”: weak econo-
my in “stagfl ation” mode caused by incorrect tax and monetary policy; failure of 
Vietnam war causing massive loss of resources as well as political instability at 
home; and fi nally rising oil prices caused by OPEC decision to introduce an em-
bargo on states supporting Israel (the Yom Kippur war). At this time the United 
States already reached its (conventional) oil peak and extraction was on a de-
cline, thus it became dependant on supply from abroad more than ever. The only 
17 D. Hambling, “Forget Fracking, Microwave Zaps Could Clean up the Oil Business”, 
New Scientist, 12.08.2015, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22730340-400-forget-frack-
ing-microwave-zaps-could-clean-up-the-oil-business/ [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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other major oil producer, Soviet Russia, remained the U.S. main rival. Rising oil 
prices hit the economy at the worst possible time, adding to the list of problems. 
As a result, the United States felt exhausted and overextended: with a failing 
economy, costs of the Vietnam war and lack of internal cohesion caused by those 
two factors it was unable to maintain high levels of engagement against the So-
viet Union.
However, the United States is a highly resilient, elastic country due to the 
complexity and vigour of its economic landscape. Time of detente with USSR 
(that fortunately for the U.S. started just before the time of its weakness) was used 
to fi nd new solutions for internal and external policy. Economic doctrines were 
changed from Keynesianism to monetarism; the U.S. forces were and pulled out 
of Vietnam, giving its army time to recuperate and reconfi gure itself with the new 
technologies and tactics. Warming up towards China started by Nixon was con-
tinued. This allowed exploiting the Sino-Soviet split. After those adjustments in 
the 80’s the United States was back in the game. Washington under Ronald Regan 
was pushing against USSR harder than ever, ultimately leading to the collapse of 
the communist block between 1989 and 1991.
Traditional wisdom explains the collapse of USSR as a combination of 
its internal weakness caused by the command “lunar” economy; imperial over-
stretch; detente between China and U.S.; costs of asymmetric war in Afghanistan; 
U.S. technological transition into information age; support for opposition move-
ments in the eastern bloc by western powers, and subsequent military build-up 
started by Washington that forced Moscow to invest massive amounts of money 
into an arms race. This depleted available resources and made communist re-
gimes very weak, shaky and unstable, which ultimately lead to the collapse of the 
communist block and abolishment of the iron curtain.
However, not often mentioned but nevertheless crucial part of this equa-
tion was the fact that OPEC countries ( mainly Saudi Arabia) increased oil supply 
causing prices to plummet.18 Soviet Russia during that time was propping up its 
economy through oil revenues. Without them, it became increasingly diffi  cult for 
its command economy to stay afl oat. Moscow together with its satellites resorted 
to borrowing money from the West.19 However, servicing the debt was consum-
ing their trade revenues. Over time all of those factors combined allowed the 
United States to “defeat” USSR without fi ring a single bullet. Regime change 
happened on its own at minimal cost and minimal risk to the U.S., with the use of 
pro-western forces already in place in the communist countries. Just like OPEC 
intervention in the ’70s allowed Russia to profi t from higher oil prices; in the ’80s 
18 S. Koepp, “Cheap Oil!”, Time, 14.04.1986, http://content.time.com/time/print-
out/0,8816,961087,00.html [accessed: 14.07.2018].
19 National Foreign Assessment Center, “Estimating Soviet and East Europe-
an Hard Currency Debt”, 1980, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RD-
P08S01350R000100180002-6.pdf [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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falling prices meant doom for its empire. A combination of internal weaknesses, 
rigidness of the regime and application of outside pressure depleted its resources, 
leading to the collapse. The system was no longer capable of sustaining itself.
Both cases – that of U.S. slow down and USSR collapse – share similari-
ties. Both powers were faced at diff erent times with a similar set of circumstances 
that depleted their national resources. First of all, their economic model was in-
suffi  cient for the then challenges: sluggish growth or depression, lack of pros-
pects and diffi  culties to reform. Secondly, they were forced to fi ght interventionist 
wars while maintaining high levels of global engagement against their rival(s). 
Finally at a crucial time they were hit by problems with oil prices, making their 
economy unstable. And this, in turn, has caused internal problems: growing dis-
sent and diffi  culty in maintaining social cohesion and order, translating into the 
lack of ability to act externally.
However, the main diff erence was in the fact that while USSR required 
certain oil price levels for its budget to remain viable, the U.S. did not. More 
importantly, America was more successful in searching and testing solutions to 
those problems. The crucial diff erence was in having a more elastic political and 
economic system. Its response to the challenges was faster. The Soviet regime, in 
contrast, did not tolerate any elasticity, the command economy could not change. 
The by-product of this was the fact that technological innovation was discour-
aged unless one was willing to do away with communism. But this was unthink-
able because the political system was entangled with the economic one and mo-
tivated ideologically: any change would destroy the credibility and legitimacy 
of the entire structure. Thus resources of the USSR were slowly depleted by war 
and arms race, and soon the inherent imbalances of the command economy were 
no longer manageable. Moscow had to use revenues coming from hydrocarbons 
as a way of sustaining itself, creating crucial vulnerability. A sudden drop in oil 
prices decreased the range of possible internal and external action due to their 
prohibitive costs.
The consequence of that was lessening of control over dependent territo-
ries, client states and allies; which allowed the U.S. to successfully support local 
dissidents and opposition, slowly dismantling the communist bloc from within. 
Attempts at reform of the Soviet system predictably destroyed the legitimacy of 
the entire regime, speeding up the process of its decline. Financially weakened 
beyond repair, USSR was incapable of intervening to keep its satellites in line, 
not to mention subsidizing their equally dysfunctional economies. Suddenly, over 
the period of two years starting in 1989 with partially free elections in Poland, 
the entire communist bloc collapsed on itself and autocratic governments were 
replaced by democratic ones. Almost overnight they chose an alliance with the 
West and the U.S. in particular. Military intervention was unnecessary. Instead, 
the regime change happened on its own at minimal costs and zero risks to the 
U.S. position worldwide.
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On the basis of this example one can summarize necessary elements of the 
regime change based on the exploitation of self-infl icted vulnerability:
1. A state is an autocratic regime.
2. The regime uses oil revenues to fuel its internal and external policies.
3. Regime stays in power by buying the support of its people and/or using 
fi nancial resources to subdue dissent.
4. The regime uses oil revenues when prices are high to engage internation-
ally in other countries.
5. Regime external policy is met with resistance, entangling it in confl icts, 
forcing it to intervene militarily, costs of intervention grow.
6. Prices of hydrocarbons drop, caused by competition on the market.
7. The regime has trouble managing its fi nancial situation.
8. Foreign rival of the regime introduces new technologies changing the 
long-term balance of powers.
9. The regime fails to do so because of its rigidness.
10. Competitor pressures regime externally. This leads to its collapse due to 
the lack of resources to sustain itself because of overspending and over-
stretch.
Russia in 2014: a testbed for the strategy of regime change 
via energy dominance
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union went through a period of visible 
power decline coupled with economic and social instability. This period led to the 
creation of a new, authoritarian regime under Vladimir Putin.
The consolidation of power by the new president was quick partially 
thanks to the spike in hydrocarbon revenues. Easy money allowed his subse-
quent governments to silence the dissent. The regime created a net of internal 
dependencies, a form of crony-capitalism, where infl uences, peace and stability 
were achieved through the division of profi ts coming from gas and oil. Corrup-
tion was an expected and desirable element of this system. Putin was success-
fully eliminating dangers to his power, such as oligarch Boris Berezovsky or 
former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko, both killed on their exile in the UK. 
Using a combination of blackmail, the corrupt justice system and a promise 
of rewards Putin was able to keep various factions within Russian society in 
check. Other elements of his success were the semi-liberal economic policy 
(low taxation, simplifi ed labour law) coupled with an increase of social secu-
rity benefi ts. The decline of Russia’s armed forces was stopped and arguably 
reversed by the mid-2000s. Around the same time, Moscow became more ag-
gressive in its local sphere, opting, for instance, to go to war with Georgia in 
2008. Despite the fact that the Russian army proved to be highly incompetent 
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and ill-prepared for the confl ict20, it was a clear sign that the age of Moscow 
passiveness on the international stage has ended. All of that was paired with 
increasingly expansionist foreign policy, aiming at creation of a “multipolar 
world”, where power of the United States would be challenged by a combina-
tion of nascent regional powers, such as China, India, Brazil, and Germany, 
with Russia as crucial link allowing them to combine their eff orts in ousting 
current hegemon from its position. In such an environment Russia would be in 
theory more successful in re-asserting itself globally, securing its interest and 
rebuilding sphere of infl uence.
However, the main focus of resurgent Russia was not on the muscle-bound 
policy of military intervention. The main target of Russia’s activity was the sphere 
of economy and political infl uence. It was trying to forge trade deals with selected 
partners, pacifying in this way their support for the American policies. Moscow 
was both selling and buying. Each transaction was geopolitically motivated and 
rarely Russia was engaging other countries purely out of monetary incentive. Ac-
cess to its market was used as leverage in negotiations. Thanks to this approach 
the country under Putin’s leadership was able to convince most of the western-
European states of the necessity of the regime’s existence for the maintenance of 
global order.
Russia’s power growth seemed to be inevitable up until 2014, when dur-
ing the Ukrainian crisis it decided to intervene militarily, taking control over the 
Crimean Peninsula and supporting – fi rst indirectly, later with the full force of 
its army – separatists in Donbas as well as all around the country. In response to 
that, the United States decided to react rather softly – by using a combination of 
selective sanctions and convincing its allies to do the same.21 But more impor-
tantly, Washington increased production of hydrocarbons leading to the collapse 
of their price.22
Sanctions were targeting several key industries, such as access to credit 
card systems, fi nancial markets, telecommunication (mobile phones), oil and gas 
extraction technologies. Those selective sanctions were not aimed at isolating 
the Russian economy – it was deemed perhaps unpractical and/or impossible23 
due to the sheer size of the country. Sanctions were rather designed to specifi -
cally make key Russian industries inoperative in the long run, hurt their fi nancial 
20 C. Vendil Pallin, F. Westerlund, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences”, 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 2009, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 400–424. doi: 10.1080/09592310902975539.
21 E.H. Christie, “Sanctions After Crimea: Have they Worked?”, NATO Review, 13.07.2015, 
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/in-
dex.htm [accessed: 14.07.2018].
22 E.L., “Why the Oil Price is Falling”, The Economist, 8.12.2014, https://www.economist.
com/the-economist-explains/2014/12/08/why-the-oil-price-is-falling [accessed: 14.07.2018].
23 G. Friedman, “The U.S. Opts for Ineff ective Sanctions on Russia”, Stratfor, 29.04.2014, 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-opts-ineff ective-sanctions-russia [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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viability, hit military modernization eff orts and limit Russia’s fi nancial stability. 
Most eff ective however was a drop in oil prices caused by an increase in supply 
by American companies, reaping rewards of years of investment in shale tech-
nology. As a result in 2015, the fi nancial situation of Russia was dire. Infl ation 
reached 15%, the budget had a defi cit of 2.4% and a year later 3.4%, economic 
growth was negative -3.3%, the recession lasted till 2017.24 Moscow reacted by 
increasing tensions on Ukraine, Baltic countries, Nordic countries, and Japan. 
Russia opted for numerous military demonstrations of strength aimed at present-
ing itself as unpredictable and dangerous. It was an intimidation tactic. Trying to 
prepare for all possible scenarios including an open war, Moscow also sped up its 
military modernization process, increasing the budget by 5 billion dollars to 64 
billion. It also began showing new equipment on parades.25 Additionally, Putin 
made the decision to commit Russian forces in the Syrian confl ict in a bid to force 
Washington to negotiate the status of Crimea and Donbas. This, however, was 
prohibitively costly. Because of sanctions Russia was practically cut off  from the 
fi nancial markets and could not sustain expenses by indebting itself. Additionally, 
it was forced to prop rouble up, leading to a drop in the foreign exchange reserves 
from 540 to 360 billion till 2015.26 Rising tensions in 2015 were met with a rather 
reserved response from the United States that decided to commit more resources 
to NATO eastern fl ank on the summit in Wales, 2014. However, the NATO pres-
ence remained rather symbolic. More importantly, Kyiv was supported in numer-
ous ways, mostly fi nancially, allowing a country to resist inertia forces that were 
collapsing its economy and destabilizing social landscape. Military support was 
not granted, but the United States have begun to organize local containment, uti-
lizing Baltic states, Sweden, Poland, and Romania.
Contrary to expectations, this very modest approach proved too much for 
Russia’s fi nances. Although Crimea remained under its control, annexed; and 
Donbas situation is nowhere near to be solved; Moscow is exhausted. In 2016 
in order to pay for its military, it introduced a 10% cut in social spending.27 De-
spite that in the next budget year, the military funds were cut by 20%.28 One can 
speculate that this was due to the necessity of maintaining social order. Moscow 
experienced an economic crisis, that forced it to re-think its geopolitical priorities 
24 Trading Economics, Russia GDP Annual Growth Rate, https://tradingeconomics.com/
russia/gdp-growth-annual [accessed: 14.07.2018].
25 “Russia Stages Massive WW2 Parade Despite Western Boycott”, BBC, 5.09.2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32668511 [accessed: 14.07.2018].
26 Trading Economics, Russia Foreign Exchange Reserves, https://tradingeconomics.com/
russia/foreign-exchange-reserves [accessed: 14.07.2018].
27 “Russia to Cut Social Spending in 2016”, Russia Today, 14.01.2016, https://www.rt.com/
business/328915-russia-social-spending-2016/ [accessed: 14.07.2018].
28 D. Dickson, J. Stubbs, “Struggling Russia Cuts Military Spending – and It Could Weak-
en Its Forces Worldwide”, Business Insider, 2.05.2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/struggling-
russia-cuts-military-spending-could-weaken-its-forces-2018-5?IR=T [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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and refocus on maintaining internal stability. Entanglement in Syria and Ukraine 
did not bring any particular benefi ts, and Russia scaled-down tensions.
This reversal would not be possible if not for the falling oil prices. A new 
surge in shale oil supply forced prices below the levels required for Russia’s 
budget to stay balanced. Selective sanctions did not achieve that – they merely 
added to the pressure, it was oil prices that did the job. As a result Russian foreign 
policy changed, decreasing in intensity. Washington, however, did not use this 
opportunity to get rid of Putin. But depleting the Russian fi nancial reserves cre-
ated an environment for concessions on Moscow’s part in the future.
Russia is an excellent case study of how America, through the domination 
of hydrocarbon markets can infl uence the behaviour and policies of oil-export 
dependent countries with authoritarian regimes in charge. Without using military 
means Washington was able to reverse the course of Moscow’s actions through 
a combination of selective pressure and oil supply increase.
Saudi Arabia: the next victim?
Saudi Arabia is one of the oldest allies of the United States. Relations between 
them date back to 1933 when American companies helped the Kingdom to create 
its oil industry. Trough Cold War the United States despite its pro-Israeli policies 
remained a major ally to Riyadh, allowing it to create a net of its own interna-
tional institutions and infl uences while securing it militarily. However, the coun-
try is not entirely aligned with the U.S. interests. In fact, many of its actions are 
undermining Washington’s position.
Saudi Arabia is wealthy due to its long-standing dominance in the global 
oil market; and is a major infl uencer of the religion of Islam thanks to the fi -
nancing of mosques around the world – Saudi Arabia supports radical religious 
movements.29
After the events of 9/11, it became increasingly obvious that Saudi Ara-
bia is simply exporting the problem of its extremism abroad. The reason why 
this is the case has less to do with the Kingdom’s ambitions as a unifi er of the 
Muslim world; and more with the fact that its internal stability is based on shaky 
ideological grounds. Saudi Arabia was founded on the alliance between tribal 
leaders and Wahhabi priests. Religion was used as a tool for unifi cation. In sub-
sequent decades the role of clerics did not diminish. They enjoy unoffi  cial auton-
omy and are generally supportive of Kingdom policies. The problem, however, 
29 “Saudi Arabia Has ‘Clear Link’ to UK Extremism, Report Says”, BBC, 5.07.2017, https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40496778; Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy De-
partment, Salafi st/Wahhabite Financial Support to Educational, Social and Religious Institutions, 
European Union 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457136/
EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457136_EN.pdf [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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is in fact that necessities of the modern world are in constant clash with the Wah-
habi fundamentalist approach, yet ruling elites require acceptance of the religious 
caste. In order to avoid internal confl ict, Saudi kings decided to channel religious-
ly motivated dissent outside, changing it into the tool of foreign policy. Thanks 
to revenues from the oil they were able to signifi cantly change the face of Islam 
around the globe. Today Wahhabi version of Islam pushed-out other interpreta-
tions. The side-eff ect of this is jihadist terrorism. The fact that Osama Bin Laden, 
responsible for the creation of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization that conducted the 
9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, was one of the Saudi princes is merely 
confi rmation of a broader pattern.
Regionally Saudi Arabia is involved in numerous schemes that are a po-
tential danger to Washington grand strategy. The general aim of this strategy is to 
dominate maritime trade routes and use control of them as a leverage in the crea-
tion of favourable rules of trade. In order to be able to do this and avoid isolation 
from the world markets the United States imperative is not to allow local powers 
to consolidate. Otherwise, those powers would be in a position to limit U.S. ac-
cess to markets. Therefore each nascent power needs to be weakened, preferably 
through the support of its rivals. At the same time, the U.S. requires maintenance 
of global peace without which trade is impossible. This grand strategy has been 
based on the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan30, Nicholas. J. Spykman.31 Their dif-
ferent interpretations have been adopted throughout the past century.
A unifi ed Middle East, dominated by Saudi Arabia under Riyadh’s lead is 
therefore not a preferable outcome for the United States. To avoid such scenario 
Washington was traditionally supporting various rivaling regional powers, like 
Israel or Turkey. However, only Iran makes Riyadh truly nervous – both coun-
tries are locked in a competition, spiced up by their religious diff erences. One 
of the reasons why the United States was so eager to stop Teheran nuclear ambi-
tions was to prevent Saudi Arabia from going nuclear in response.32 Prolifera-
tion of nuclear weaponry is not in U.S. interest since it weakens the importance 
of its own arsenal and makes a given country practically impervious to military 
action. It is believed that Saudis have paid for the Pakistani nuclear program, 
and in theory, they can obtain Islamabad’s bombs very quickly.33 The vision of 
the Kingdom not only as an oil state and ideological epicenter of radical Islam 
30 A.T. Mahan, The Infl uence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, New York 1987.
31 N.J. Spykman, H.R. Nicholl, The Geography of the Peace, New York 1944.
32 P. Wintour, “Saudi Crown Prince Warns It Will Build Nuclear Bomb if Tehran Does the 
Same”, The Guardian, 15.03.2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/15/saudi-ara-
bia-iran-nuclear-bomb-threat-mohammed-bin-salman [accessed: 14.07.2018].
33 J. Stone, “Saudi Arabia Says It Won’t Rule out Building Nuclear Weapons”, Indepen-
dent, 27.03.2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-it-
wont-rule-out-building-nuclear-weapons-10139229.html; M. Urban, “Saudi Nuclear Weapons ‘On 
Order’ from Pakistan”, BBC, 6.11.2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24823846 
[accessed: 14.07.2018].
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but also a power equipped with nuclear weapons is not appealing to the United 
States. The logical thing to do would be to lock powerful states of the Mid-
dle East in a balance-of-powers style tug-of-war so that they will be forced to 
waste their resources on keeping their rivals in check. In such an environment 
the United States is in a comfortable position of the off -shore balancer, sup-
porting any side depending on the situation. But this in the environment of the 
Middle East proved to be almost impossible. Firstly, because it would require 
normalization of relations with Iran. And this would risk arms race with Saudis, 
leading perhaps even to a local war. And secondly – due to the dependency of 
Washington on the stability of oil prices.
Riyadh is capable of wrecking the international oil market, and in 70’s it 
already shown that it can do it. In the event of military confl ict, the Gulf States 
are able also to use force to stop the fl ow of oil. The only option left was care-
ful manoeuvring between various local factions, forcing Riyadh to spent its 
resources on maintaining the status quo. A good example of that is Washing-
ton’s support for Riyadh’s involvement in Yemeni civil war.34 In order to pre-
vent destabilization that was favouring Iran-backed groups, Saudi Arabia was 
forced to intervene militarily. This proved to be very costly, depleting King-
dom’s budget over time.35
For the United States the Middle East is an unsolvable puzzle: it has 
too many pieces locked in a dynamic strife, and dominance of any piece has 
negative consequences for American interests worldwide. The margin of error 
is zero. However, once oil and gas are removed from the equation, the situ-
ation becomes much simpler since virtually all participants of this deadlock 
are dependent on revenues from hydrocarbons. Once prices drop the inherent 
contradictions in local regimes will be visible. This is especially true for Saudi 
Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is not a “proper country”, because it has no nation to rule 
over. Instead, it is a state based on a peculiar form of a social contract. If the 
regime cannot hold its part of the bargain, it loses legitimacy and loyalty of its 
subjects. In that sense, it is closer to feudal rule than to the modern government. 
The Kingdom has been created by allying various groups of tribes, families of 
importance and clerics; each of them received a set of specifi c privileges within 
state institutions, for which Saudis are paying. If the ruling family runs out 
of money it cannot be sure of their loyalty. And given the way how country’s 
wealth is redistributed – it is now a likely scenario.
34 J. Crowe, “Report: U.S. Forces More Involved in Yemeni Civil War than Pentagon Ad-
mitted”, National Review, 3.05.2018, https://www.nationalreview.com/news/yemen-us-involve-
ment-more-pentagon-acknowledges/ [accessed: 14.07.2018].
35 A. Torchia, “Cost no Barrier to Saudi Arabia’s Yemen Intervention”, Reuters, 31.03.2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-cost/cost-no-barrier-to-saudi-arabias-ye-
men-intervention-idUSKBN0MR1KZ20150331 [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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Firstly, Riyadh’s economy is dependent on foreign labour. Its population 
cannot support complex modern industry and services. Saudi Arabia gets em-
ployees from Asian and western states. Depending on estimates between 33%36 
and 37%37 of its population is foreign-born, dominating the labour market to the 
absurd degree. In 2016 83% of workers in private companies were foreigners; 
in the case of government jobs, this number was only slightly less appalling: 
60%.38 Most of the jobs performed by foreigners are low-skilled. Only 1/3 of the 
working-age population of Saudi Arabia works or actively seeks employment39, 
though offi  cial statistics claim that unemployment is about 11%. Kingdom wel-
fare policies are not helping, deterring from work. Atop of numerous subsidies, 
a generous handout system exists mixed with high wages for government jobs. 
In the past, this combination was used to get rid of dissent.40 This model is well 
known as the “gulf rentier state”.41 The entire budget for 2018 amounts to 261 
billion dollars. Just to give an indication of the scale of social spending one can 
look at the recent program: half of the population qualifi ed and the monthly 
costs of just this social scheme amounted to half of a billion dollars.42 The state 
pays for all of this thanks to hydrocarbons: most of the population is exempt 
from taxation.43 To make matters worse economy is completely dominated by 
one sector: oil. 50% of its GDP is created there, and between 70 to even 90% of 
36 “KSA Population Is 30.8m; 33% Expats”, Arab News, 31.01.2015, http://www.arab-
news.com/featured/news/697371 [accessed: 14.07.2018].
37 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. Saudi Arabia, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html [accessed: 14.07.2018].
38 Ministry of Labor and Social Development Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia 
Labor Market Report 2016, July 2016, https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/ff 00f1f0/fi les/uploaded/
G20%20Labor%20Market%20Report%202016%20-%20Final%20-%20Low%20res.pdf; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Labor Market Reforms to Boost Employment and Productivity in the GCC, 
Gulf Cooperation Council, 5.10.2013, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/100513.pdf 
[accessed: 14.07.2018].
39 A. McDowall, “Saudi Arabia Doubles Private Sector Jobs In 30-month Period”, Al 
Arabiya, 19.01.2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/2014/01/20/Saudi-Arabiya-dou-
bles-number-of-citizens-in-private-sector-jobs.html [accessed: 14.07.2018].
40 C. Hodgson, “The Fragile Balance Between Saudi Arabia’s Ruling Class and Its People 
is ‘Unsustainable’”, Bussiness Insider, 16.11.2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabi-
an-social-contract-unsustainable-2017-11?IR=T [accessed: 14.07.2018].
41 H. Beblawi, G. Luciani, The Rentier State, London–New York 2016; M. Gray, A Theory 
of “Late Rentierism” in the Arab States of the Gulf, Occasional Paper 2011 (7), https://repository.li-
brary.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558291/CIRSOccasionalPaper7MatthewGray2011.
pdf [accessed: 14.07.2018].
42 “Saudi Arabia Pays $533mn to Half the Population in New Welfare System”, Russia 
Today, 21.12.2017, https://www.rt.com/newsline/413880-saudi-arabia-welfare-system/ [accessed: 
14.07.2018].
43 International Monetary Fund, Diversifying Government Revenue in the GCC: Next Steps, 
Gulf Cooperation Council, 26.10.2016, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/102616.pdf 
[accessed: 14.07.2018].
110 JERZY ZARZYCKI-SIEK
trade revenues depend on it.44 Total revenues of budget dependant on oil reach 
up to 70–80%.45 Growing costs of welfare state atop of falling oil prices have 
become subject of concern for the regime.
There is a general feeling that drastic changes are necessary. However 
there are no plans for creating the modern economy, instead, all ideas revolve 
around maintaining the rentier state.
One of the ideas is to re-create the dynamics of other Gulf countries, like 
Qatar. Those city-states build infrastructure and institutions to attract world 
companies from markets like fi nances or transport, learning how to compete 
in those fi elds. This allows to slowly move away from oil and gas. But Saudi 
Arabia’s population is too big. This did not deter Saudis from trying, however. 
Their plan is to create a city, or rather a net of cities, where companies and in-
ventors from all around the world would enjoy high levels of freedom, low tax-
es, and luxurious infrastructure in exchange for access to fruits of their labour. 
At the same time foreigners would be isolated from the general population, so 
that religious caste would be appeased. Many such multi-billion dollar projects 
were initiated, but not fi nished. For instance Jeddah Economic City (20 billion), 
or King Abdullah Economic City (100 billion). Till today it is not fi nished, 
a drain on Kingdoms budget. Saudis are determined on this path and recently 
announced another city of this nature on a much bigger scale: NEOM.46 Total 
costs of this one hover around 500 billion. However, it is unclear how such 
projects can save the country of 20 million unemployed.
The newest idea is to invest in a massive Vision Fund, created by Soft-
Bank.47 SoftBank hopes to invest in emerging, disruptive technologies such as 
robotics, AI, genetic engineering. Kingdom invested 45 billion in a 100 billion 
dollar fund. But the necessity of maintaining a generous welfare state, paying 
for foreign workers, intervention in local wars and buying favours from other 
Arab states in addition to investing in the fund and creating two city projects 
proved to be too much for the Kingdom’s fi nances in an environment of low 
oil prices. IMF estimated in 2015, that at the then rate – Saudi Arabia will run 
44 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, op. cit.
45 A. Feteha, V. Nereim, “Saudi Arabia’s Safety-Net Spending Wipes Out New Tax Gains”, 
Bloomberg, 9.05.2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-09/saudi-arabia-s-
safety-net-spending-wipes-out-new-tax-gains [accessed: 14.07.2018].
46 A. Shahine, G. Carey, V. Nereim, “Saudi Arabia Just Announced Plans to Build a Mega 
City That Will Cost $500 Billion”, Bloomberg, 24.10.2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-10-24/saudi-arabia-to-build-new-mega-city-on-country-s-north-coast [accessed: 
14.07.2018].
47 K. Benner, “Masayoshi Son’s Grand Plan for SoftBank’s $100 Billion Vision Fund”, 
The New York Times, 10.10.2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/technology/masay-
oshi-son-softbank-vision-fund.html; R. Molla, “This is Where SoftBank’s $98 Billion Vision Fund 
Has Invested so Far”, Recode, 7.12.2017, https://www.recode.net/2017/12/7/16747706/where-has-
softbank-vision-fund-invested [accessed: 14.07.2018].
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out of reserves within fi ve years.48 As a result, in order to get stakes in the 
Singularity Fund and to create NEOM, for the fi rst time in history Saudis were 
forced to sell shares in their state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco.49 De-
spite that in 2018 the new budget of the Kingdom has an 8.9% defi cit, and it is 
bigger than ever. Spending across the board increased, trying to appease vari-
ous interest groups, while regime hectically searches for sources of income: 
slashing fuel subsidies, limiting privileges of government workers, introduc-
ing new taxes.50 But essentially all newfound revenues have been consumed by 
an increase in social spending and in wages. Attempts at manoeuvring between 
contradictory requirements did not bring positive results. Kingdom got into 
a slight recession.
Saudi Arabia tries to modernize and diversify the economy. However, 
by doing so it risks destabilization. Social reform such as allowing women to 
drive51 or to participate in selected sports events52 are not changing anything of 
signifi cance while aggravating infl uential religious groups. At the same time, 
Kingdom’s unoffi  cial succession rules have been broken53 and dissent among 
elites due to this has been brutally eradicated through an unprecedented anti-
corruption campaign, allowing the new heir to the throne to consolidate power 
despite opposition.54 It is not unreasonable to think that the dissent reaches 
deeper than that, and this move was supposed to merely intimidate the rest of 
potential conspirators.
48 International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia, Regional Economic Out-
look 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/mcd/eng/pdf/menap1015.pdf [accessed: 
14.07.2018].
49 T. DiChristopher, “Saudi Aramco’s IPO, the World’s Largest Ever, Is ‘On Track’ for 
2018, CEO Amin Nasser Says”, CNBC, 23.10.2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/23/saudi-ar-
amco-public-off ering-is-on-track-for-2018-ceo-amin-nasser.html [accessed: 14.07.2018].
50 A. Feteha, “Key Figures in Saudi Arabia’s 2018 Budget, 2017 Fiscal Data”, Bloomberg, 
19.12.2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-19/key-fi gures-in-saudi-arabia-s-
2018-budget-2017-fi scal-data; E.R. Wald, “Saudi Arabia’s 2018 Budget Is The Country’s Largest 
Ever”, Forbes, 19.12.2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2017/12/19/saudi-arabias-
2018-budget-is-the-countrys-largest-ever/#71026c7c5e29 [accessed: 14.07.2018].
51 B. Hubbard, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive”, The New York Times, 
26.10.2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.
html [accessed: 14.07.2018].
52 “Saudi Arabia to Let Women Enter Sports Stadiums in 2018”, Reuters, 30.10.2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-women-stadiums/saudi-arabia-to-let-women-enter-
sports-stadiums-in-2018-idUSKBN1CZ0LQ [accessed: 14.07.2018].
53 B. Hubbard, “Saudi King Rewrites Succession, Replacing Heir With Son, 31”, The New 
York Times, 21.06.2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-
crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman.html [accessed: 14.07.2018].




Even if gamble on disruptive technologies amidst political turmoil will 
succeed it will take decades for the Kingdom to see the results. If the situation 
of lower oil prices will continue, the Kingdom may face internal instability of 
unparalleled proportions. It is not clear whether the risk of investing in new, un-
certain technologies will be able to save the regime before it is too late.
Conclusions
The Energy Domination Plan is a facilitator of what may come in the next 
decade. The United States has still tremendous potential for innovation and 
has the capability to re-imagine itself in the face of diffi  culties. The creation of 
new technologies allows it not to solve structural problems, but to jump over 
them. Becoming the number one hydrocarbon producer is an example of this 
vitality. It will allow the U.S. to change the geopolitics of many regions. Lower 
hydrocarbon prices will have a negative impact on regimes exporting them. 
Weakening those regimes and making them more restricted in their range of 
actions will at the same time increase this range for Washington. In Europe, 
the fact that American gas and oil will be sold allows the U.S. to change the 
behaviour of many eastern and western European states, de-coupling their poli-
cies from the infl uences of Moscow. Similarly ability to sell gas through the 
South Korean hub will open the possibility of dominating Asian markets, tying 
their governments with Washington in new ways. As for the Gulf States, mainly 
Saudi Arabia – their existence depends wholly on the sale of hydrocarbons. 
Once this pillar is taken away, their regimes cannot function. The United States 
will indirectly solve the Middle Eastern conundrum – without hydrocarbon rev-
enues countries of this region will be more than ever dependent on the off -shore 
balancer. Both Iran and in particular Saudi Arabia will become much weaker. 
Washington will be able to shift its support between local powers in accordance 
with the needs of the moment.
Regardless of that oil-dependent regimes will become more preoccupied 
with maintaining internal stability, becoming fragile and susceptible to exter-
nal infl uences. The United States will be in a unique position to change their 
regimes – if it chooses so.
And even if countries like Russia or Saudi Arabia will survive in their 
current form, the upcoming electric revolution will sweep away the basis of 
their power: oil and gas will become things of the past. While oil-regimes will 
be struggling to fi ght the competition coming from the U.S., the very market 
they want to dominate will shrink more and more, leaving them with less to 
work with while giving Washington more room to manoeuvre.
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Ameryka i plan Dominacji Energetycznej – nowy sposób zmiany reżimu?
W grudniu 2017 r. administracja prezydenta Donalda Trumpa zapowiedziała zasadniczą zmianę 
w amerykańskiej polityce energetycznej. Korzystając z rewolucji w wydobyciu gazu i ropy, tzw. 
shale revolution, USA podejmie próbę dominacji światowego rynku węglowodorów. Plan wymaga 
zmian w prawie, stworzenia nowej infrastruktury oraz porozumień handlowych, które pozwolą 
amerykanom na eksport ropy oraz gazu za granicę na znacznie większą niż dotychczas skalę.
Artykuł analizuje możliwy wpływ tej decyzji na geopolitykę krajów eksportujących ropę 
naftową, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Rosji oraz Arabii Saudyjskiej. Obydwa kraje posiadają 
gospodarki mocno zależne od eksportu gazu i ropy – bez niego ich budżety mogą mieć trudności 
w fi nansowaniu działalności swoich państw, a gospodarki w utrzymaniu się na powierzchni. Jed-
nocześnie kraje te prezentują typ polityki zagranicznej, który jest wysoce zależny fi nansowo od 
sprzedaży węglowodorów, dlatego brak zysków może utrudnić utrzymanie im obecnego kursu. 
W przypadku Rosji może to spowodować problemy w kontynuowaniu agresywnej postawy wobec 
USA. Z kolei Arabia Saudyjska może nie zagwarantowanie równowagi sił w regionie w odpowie-
dzi na działania wrogiego Iranu, rosnącej w siłę Turcji, asertywnego Izraela oraz różnego typu 
aktywnych rebeliantów-dżihadystów operujących w przygranicznych krajach.
Artykuł stwierdza, że połączenie amerykańskiego planu dominacji energetycznej z radykal-
nymi zmianami w przemyśle motoryzacyjnym – który przechodzi z ropy na energię elektrycz-
ną – znacząco zmniejszy zdolność Rosji, Arabii Saudyjskiej oraz innych państw stosujących po-
dobną politykę do fi nansowania swoich działań ze sprzedaży ropy i gazu, przemieniając te zyski 
w wpływy międzynarodowe. Stany Zjednoczone znajdą się na wyjątkowej pozycji, która pozwoli 
na zastosowanie narzędzi selektywnego nacisku na gospodarki Rosji i Arabii Saudyjskiej, tak aby 
wpłynąć na zachowanie tych państw. Zarówno Moskwa, jak i Rijad pozbawione zysków ze sprze-
daży węglowodorów, stracą zdolność do: utrzymania poparcia dla reżimów, pacyfi kowania nie-
zadowolenia, jak również projekcji sił na zewnątrz. W rezultacie pozycja Waszyngtonu wzrośnie, 
pomimo rosnącej roli Chin w świecie, który staje się coraz bardziej asertywny wobec amerykań-
skiej polityki.
Słowa kluczowe: Stany Zjednoczone, Rosja, Arabia Saudyjska, ropa, plan dominacji energetycz-
nej, geopolityka
America and Energy Domination Plan – A New Way of Regime Change?
In December of 2017 the U.S. administration under President Donald Trump announced a funda-
mental change in the U.S. energy policy. Capitalizing on the rapid changes in oil and gas extrac-
tion technologies called the shale revolution, the U.S. will attempt to dominate the world market 
of hydrocarbons. The plan calls for regulatory changes, building new infrastructure and creating 
trade agreements that will allow the U.S. to export oil and gas abroad on a much bigger scale than 
previously.
This article examines the possible impact of this decision on the geopolitics of oil-exporting 
countries, with a particular focus on Russia and Saudi Arabia. Both of those countries have econo-
mies heavily dependent on oil and gas exports. Without them, their budgets may have diffi  culty in 
fi nancing state operations and economies – staying afl oat. At the same time, they both present the 
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type of foreign policy that is fi nanced from the sale of hydrocarbons. Without those profi ts, it may 
be challenging for them to continue this approach. In the case of Russia, it may result in problems 
with maintaining its aggressive stance towards the U.S. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh may 
not be able to guarantee the balance of powers in the region vis-a-vis hostile Iran, growing Turkey, 
assertive Israel and active jihadist rebels of various kind in neighbouring countries.
Paper concludes that a combination of the U.S. energy dominance plan together with radical 
shifts in the automobile industry – which is transitioning from gasoline engines to electrical ones – 
will signifi cantly decrease the ability of Russia, Saudi Arabia and others using similar policy com-
binations to transform their oil and gas revenues into international infl uence. The United States will 
be in a unique position to use tools of selective pressure on their economies to alter their behaviour. 
Both Moscow and Riyadh without the hydrocarbon profi ts will lose their ability to: maintain sup-
port for the regime, pacify dissent as well as projecting power outside. As a result, Washington’s 
position in the world will increase, despite the growing role of China and despite the world that is 
becoming more assertive towards the U.S. power.
Key words: United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, oil, energy domination plan, geopolitics
